Do global trade distortions still harm developing country farmers ? by Anderson, Kym & Valenzuela, Ernesto
 
Do Global Trade Distortions Still Harm 












Development Research Group 
The World Bank 
1818 H Street NW 









World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3901, April 2006 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the 
exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, 
even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should 
be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely 
those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, 




*This is a product of the World Bank’s project on Poverty Alleviation Through Reducing 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives. The authors are grateful for helpful comments from project 
























































































































We estimate the impact of global merchandise trade distortions and services regulations 
on agricultural value added in various countries. Using the latest versions of the GTAP 
database and the GTAP-AGR model of the global economy, our results suggest real net 
farm incomes would rise in developing countries with a move to free trade, thereby 
alleviating rural poverty – despite a terms of trade deterioration for developing countries 
that are net food importers or are enjoying preferential access to agricultural markets of 
high-income countries. We also show, for several large developing countries, the 
contribution of their own versus other countries’ trade policies.  
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  While developing country farmers contribute less than 3 percent of global GDP, 
they account for 43 percent of global employment, 64 percent of global agricultural 
value added, and a similarly large share of global poverty as measured by earnings of 
less than $1 a day. Raising net farm incomes is therefore a key to meeting the 
Millennium Development Goal of halving global poverty by 2015. If that can be done 
by policy reforms that also boost the efficiency of resource use and raise developing 
country and world GDP, so much the better. This paper asks if reducing trade policy 
distortions (including agricultural subsidies in high-income countries) could provide 
such a magic bullet.  
  Two decades ago, the answer to that question was unequivocally affirmative. A 
number of studies provided a clear picture of the adverse effects of government policies 
on farmers’ incentives in developing countries in the 1980s. Farm subsidies and import 
restrictions of developed countries depressed the international prices of farm relative to 
non-farm products (Tyers and Anderson 1986, 1992), while developing countries’ own 
trade and exchange rate policies further depressed their farmers’ incentives (Krueger, 
Schiff and Valdes 1988) – as they had since at least the 1960s (Little, Scitovsky and 
Scott 1970; Balassa and Associates 1971). Time series data for developed and newly 
industrializing countries up to that time also indicated a clear tendency for national 
governments to gradually change from taxing to subsidizing agricultural relative to 
industrial production (and from subsidizing to taxing food consumers) in the course of 




tendency continued, today’s developing country farmers would be even more adversely 
affected by richer countries’ policies.  
However, several developments since the mid-1980s have altered the policy 
environment. First, the World Trade Organization’s Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture -- negotiated over the period 1986-94 and implemented in the subsequent 
ten years -- slowed and in some cases reversed the growth in agricultural protection. 
Second, recent accessions to WTO (especially of China and Taiwan from early 2002) 
added to the commitments to limit agricultural tariffs and subsidies. Third, early this 
decade developed countries expanded non-reciprocal preferential access to their 
markets for developing country exports, notably via the Africa Growth and Opportunity 
Act adopted by the US Congress in 2000 and the ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative in 
2001 by the European Union (which added to EU preferences provided to former 
colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific under the Lome Convention). 
Meanwhile, many developing countries themselves have opted to reduce their own 
disincentives against their farmers, as part of overall structural adjustments encouraged 
by international lending institutions (World Bank 2002).  
Given these policy developments, is it still the case that developing country 
farmers are discriminated against by the patterns of trade distortions across sectors and 
regions? By the mid-1990s it appeared to one group of analysts that, for the sample of 
fifteen developing countries they examined, the problem of an anti-agricultural bias in 
those countries’ own trade and sectoral policies had all but disappeared (Jensen, 
Robinson and Tarp 2002). Even if we assume the price distortions used in that study 




representative of all developing countries? Are there, for example, some more-
advanced developing countries that have ‘overshot’ and adopted the potentially equally 
wasteful pro-agricultural policy bias of high-income economies? And how are those 
high-income countries’ somewhat-reformed policies and preferential access agreements 
now affecting developing country farmers?  
To answer all but the last of those questions requires extending the time series 
of estimates of distortions in the Krueger/Schiff/Valdes sample and expanding theirs 
and the Jensen/Robinson/Tarp sample to a wider range of countries. That is the focus of 
a new research project getting under way at the World Bank.  
As a prelude to that new project, though, it is possible to answer the question in 
the title of the present paper using a new database for 2001 at least. Specifically, the 
present paper addresses two questions. First, what would be the consequences for 
agricultural value added (net farm incomes) if all countries were to remove their trade 
distortions simultaneously (as in an ideal WTO round), as distinct from just reducing 
their own distortions? While no-one anticipates such a radical reform, the analysis can 
serve as a benchmark to suggest what is at stake in the WTO’s current round of 
multilateral trade negotiations (Anderson and Martin 2005, 2006). The second question 
addressed below is: for a selection of large developing countries and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, what contribution would their own unilateral reform make to the impact on net 
farm incomes of global reform?
1  
                                                 
1   The Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988) and Jensen, Robinson and Tarp (2002) studies focused on 
effects of just own-country policies, the first using partial equilibrium and the second using national 
general equilibrium models. On the relationship between those two methodologies, and for reasons 




Specifically, we make use of a new variant of a model of the global economy 
known as GTAP-AGR (Keeney and Hertel 2005) to provide real farm income effects of 
moving to free trade by developing countries versus by high-income countries, and in 
agriculture as compared with non-agricultural sectors. We also make use of the latest 
GTAP database (Version 6), which has the virtue of including not only reciprocal but 
also non-reciprocal preferential tariffs, the latter providing exporters in many low-
income countries with duty-free access to protected high-income country markets. This 
allows us to take into account the fact that such a reform may cause a decline in the 
international terms of trade for those developing countries that are enjoying preferential 
access to agricultural markets of high-income countries (in addition to those that are net 
food importers because their comparative advantage is in other sectors such as labor-
intensive manufacturing). 
The paper begins with an examination of current distortions, the emphasis being 
mainly on import tariffs since they are later shown to be far more important than 
agricultural subsidies. This is followed by a description of GTAP-AGR model of the 
global economy to be used to analyze the consequences of removing those distortions. 
The key results of the simulations are then presented, distinguishing between the 
impacts of policies of high-income and developing countries, of agricultural and non-
agricultural (including services) policies and, within agriculture, of the different policy 
instruments and the different commodity programs. The paper concludes by 
highlighting the key messages and suggestion priority areas for further research. 
Key distortions in global markets 




Border measures traditionally have been the main means by which governments 
distort prices in their domestic markets for products, with the price of tradables relative 
to nontradables affected by interventions in the market for foreign exchange, and the 
relative prices of the various tradables affected by trade taxes-cum-subsidies or 
quantitative trade restrictions. Product-specific domestic producer or consumer 
subsidies have played a more limited role (because of their much greater cost to the 
treasury), with a few exceptions most notably in agriculture in high-income countries 
(Legg 2003; OECD 2005a). With the freeing up of most foreign exchange markets over 
the past two decades (Hinkle and Montiel 1999), the phasing out of most export taxes 
(Piermartini 2004; Theile 2004), and the conversion of many non-tariff trade barriers 
into tariffs including for farm products (Ingco 1996), the task of measuring the extent of 
distortions to goods markets is made much easier in that attention can focus on import 
tariffs and OECD agricultural subsidies. Services regulations also could distort 
incentives in the agricultural and industrial sectors, so it is worth exploring their effects 
on farm income too -- although much controversy still surrounds their measurement 
and how they should be modeled. 
The latest release of the GTAP dataset, Version 6, includes estimates of bilateral 
tariffs and of domestic and export subsidies as of 2001 for 87 countries and country 
groups spanning the world, and for 57 aggregated sectors of the economy. This is a 
substantial improvement over Version 5 of the GTAP dataset, which relates to policies 
in 1997. The new protection data come from a joint CEPII (Paris)/ITC (Geneva) 




details on bilateral tariffs (incorporating all significant reciprocal and non-reciprocal 
preferences) including ad valorem tariff equivalents of specific and compound tariffs 
and key non-tariff barriers such as tariff rate quotas (TRQs).
2 The new GTAP database 
has lower tariffs than the previous Version 5 database because of the inclusion for the 
first time of non-reciprocal trade preferences and because of major reforms between 
1997 and 2001 such as China’s progress towards WTO accession (which alone 
contributed to the ratio of global exports plus imports to GDP rising from 44 to 46 
percent over those four years) and the continued implementation of the Uruguay Round 
agreements (van der Mensbrugghe 2006). 
According to this dataset, the average import tariff in high-income countries in 
2001 is 20.2 percent for primary agricultural products, and 13.0 percent for processed 
food, compared with just 0.5 percent for other primary products and 2.1 percent for 
other manufactures.
3 In developing countries, by contrast, the average tariff for primary 
agriculture is lower at 17.0 percent, while it is higher for the other three sectors at 19.3 
percent for processed food, 2.5 percent for other primary products, and 10.0 for other 
manufactures. Needless to say, these averages vary considerably within those two 
country groups, as shown in Table 1(a).  
These import tariff averages can be poor indicators of overall assistance to 
farming, even if there were no farm production or trade subsidies or any exceptional tax 
                                                 
2   More information on the MAcMaps database is available in Bouët et al. (2004) and at 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/macmap.htm. For details of its incorporation into the GTAP 
Version 6 dataset, see Dimaranan and McDougall (2005) and www.gtap.org.  
3   High-income countries include all members of the EU25, NAFTA and the OECD (except Turkey) 
plus Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. All others (including the wealthy Middle East countries) 
are considered developing countries and are further split into middle- and low-income categories as 




treatment for the sector. For example, if high-income countries’ import tariffs are at 
near-prohibitive levels for temperate farm products but are low for tropical products 
such as coffee, their import-weighted average agricultural tariff could be quite low yet 
agricultural value added in those rich countries would have been enhanced 
substantially. Consider also the case of a developing country with a strong agricultural 
comparative advantage in all but one small farming industry, and with high tariffs to 
reduce import competition for that industry and for all manufacturing industries. 
Overall agricultural value added would be depressed by that structure of protection, yet 
the import-weighted average tariff protection for agriculture would be high and 
possibly above that for manufactures. A third case is where the non-agricultural 
primary sector receives a similar level of import protection as the farm sector and less 
than the manufacturing sector, but is much more export-focused than agriculture: trade 
reform may cause it to expand at the expense not only of manufacturing but also of 
farming. Hence it is not possible to say from the tariff data in Table 1(a) alone whether 
developing country policies now have a pro-agricultural bias, even though the ratio of 
agricultural to all goods tariffs in that table is well above unity for each of the regions 
shown. What is needed is a general equilibrium model to estimate the net effects of 
own and other countries’ various sectoral distortions on agricultural markets and net 
farm income. The latter impact, on agricultural value added, is a measure of the global 
general equilibrium effective rate of assistance to the primary agricultural sector, a 
portion of which is attributable to own-country policies.
4 
                                                 
4   This approach is similar to that taken by Dihel (2004) except that only own-country policies are 




Before turning to that model, the Version 6 GTAP database needs to be 
augmented to include distortions to services sectors.
5 We follow Hertel and Keeney 
(2006) in assuming the removal of services distortions can be modeled as a 
technological change that reduces the cost to all sectors of imported intermediate 
inputs. The extent of those trade cost equivalent barriers in services are based on work 
by Francois, Meijl, and Tongeren (2005), who draw on the pattern of residuals from a 
gravity model of national imports estimated from the GTAP database. Their estimates 
are shown in Table 2. 
 
The GTAP-AGR Model  
 
We employ a new variant of the widely used GTAP model (Hertel 1997) that is 
specifically oriented to analyzing agricultural markets, namely the GTAP-AGR model 
(Keeney and Hertel 2005).  We use the standard GTAP model assumptions of perfect 
competition and constant returns to scale in production activities, a Constant Difference 
of Elasticities (CDE) demand system which permits differential price and income 
responsiveness across countries, and bilateral international trade flows handled through 
Armington elasticities by which products are differentiated by country of origin.
6 These 
Armington elasticities are region-specific, and are econometric estimates at the 57 
                                                 
5   We also insert a production subsidy for US cotton, following the WTO dispute settlement case 
which ruled that those subsidies belong in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture’s amber 
box, rather than in the green box as notified by the US. We conservatively estimate that subsidy to 
be 28 percent for 2001. 
6   The Armington elasticities are very important determinants of the results, and those used in the 
GTAP model are quite conservative compared with those in, for example, the World Bank’s Linkage 
model (see the Appendix to Ch. 12 in Anderson and Martin 2006). For this reason, the key results in 




GTAP commodity level based on the elasticity of substitution in consumption among 
imported goods from different sources (Hertel et al. 2003).  
The GTAP-AGR model introduces a number of modifications to the way 
agriculture is handled in the standard GTAP model, based on recent econometric 
studies. First, it incorporates a region-specific elasticity of land transformation amongst 
agriculture uses. While land is specific to agriculture in the GTAP model, the new 
parameters in GTAP-AGR make land less responsive within the agricultural sector to 
changes in relative agriculture prices. Second, GTAP-AGR incorporates region-specific 
labor and capital supply elasticities in constant elasticity of transformation functions 
that allocate their use between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. The limited 
mobility of labor allows for wage differentials between agriculture and non-agricultural 
sectors, and capital too is allowed to receive return differentials between agricultural 
and non-agricultural activities. These supply elasticities are based on estimates from the 
OECD (2001). Third, the GTAP-AGR model also allows for substitution among farm-
owned and purchased inputs, and between the two, by calibrating each sector’s constant 
elasticity of substitution cost function to the region-specific Allen elasticities of 
substitution provided by OECD estimates. Fourth, the livestock production function is 
modified to capture more realistic substitution possibilities in feed demand, by 
modeling the substitution possibilities for feedstuffs as an additional CES nest in the 
sector’s cost function. This livestock production function is parameterized based on a 
three-stage model describing the behavior of European livestock producers, composite 
feed mixers, and grain producers (Surry 1990). Finally, the GTAP-AGR consumer 




commodities, and calibrated in line with a recent set of price and income elasticities 
from a cross-country study (Seale, Regmi and Bernstein 2003).
7  
In the simulations that follow, we use the standard GTAP closure. This assumes 
that the levels of each region’s employment of each of the productive factors is fixed in 
aggregate, and that the regional balance of trade is determined by the relationship of 
regional investment and savings, where international capital mobility is determined by 
equalizing rates of return across regions. 
To keep the sizes of the table of results reasonable, we aggregate the GTAP 6 
database to 27 regions and 29 sectors, bearing in mind the need to provide some detail 
in the agri-food sectors. These regions and sectors are listed in Appendix Tables A1 and 
A2, respectively.  
 
Effects of removing distortive goods and services policies globally 
 
  The estimated effects of full global trade liberalization as of 2001 on each of the 
four sectors’ value added are summarized for the key developing country regions in 
Table 3 and are shown with more country detail for just agricultural value added in 
Table 4. Beginning with the top right-hand numbers of Table 3, these results suggest 
real farm incomes in developing countries are still harmed by the existing pattern of 
global trade distortions, and more so than any of the other goods sectors (non-
                                                 
7   While one of the benefits of using a global general equilibrium framework is the modeling of all 
economic agents’ behaviors, and in this case also the depiction of some specifics of agricultural 
markets in the GTAP-AGR model, the results necessarily depend on the parameters chosen. A 
natural validation of the model is to see how well the model is able to replicate historical records. 
Support for the use of the GTAP-AGR model is provided by Valenzuela (2006) who shows that the 




agricultural primary production, food processing, and other manufacturing) and 
therefore than non-agriculture in total. In the absence of those policies, agricultural 
value added would have been 5.7 percent higher on average, and higher in each of the 
six developing country regions shown in that table relative to non-agriculture in total 
(compare with the numbers in parentheses in the final column of Table 3). There is 
considerable regional variation though: the averages are 12 percent higher in Latin 
America, 10 percent higher in East Asia (excluding Korea and Taiwan which, with 
Hong Kong and Singapore, we classify as high-income), 3 percent higher in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and less than 2 percent higher in the three other developing country 
regions. 
  Turning to the top left-hand numbers of Table 3, it is clear that most of that gain 
to developing country farmers would come from the removal of agricultural tariffs and 
subsidies in high-income countries.
8 Net farm incomes in all developing country 
regions, even those that are net food importers and those receiving preferential access 
to protected markets in high-income countries, would be boosted by such reform. By 
contrast, according to the GTAP Version 6 database and GTAP-AGR model used here, 
agricultural value added in all developing country regions would be reduced by the 
reform of agricultural and food policies in developing countries themselves. This is not 
surprising, given the high protection to agriculture in both high-income and developing 
countries reported in Table 1(a). Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 show that loss would be 
partly offset by reform in non-agricultural sectors though, with services reform making 
                                                 
8   Decomposition of those results reveals that more than two-thirds of the gains to developing country 
farm incomes from high-income country agricultural policy reform would come from removal of 
tariffs, and that domestic rather than export subsidies contribute most of the rest. See the discussion 




almost as much of a contribution as reform of other goods sectors (and considerably 
more in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia).
9 This partial offset is consistent with the 
fact developing countries have tariffs on non-food manufactures that are sizeable but 
less than those for agriculture, and whose removal has the effect of lowering a little the 
price of mobile factors employed in farming. 
  Value added in the processed food sector is similarly affected, although to a 
lesser extent on average than in the farm sector. Value added in non-agricultural 
primary production is affected very much less for developing countries as a whole, but 
note from the final column of Table 3 that it benefits proportionately more than farming 
in Africa, the Middle East and the former Soviet Union where that sector is of relatively 
greater importance. By contrast, non-food manufacturing value added would decline in 
all developing country regions except Asia following a move to global free trade. This 
is despite its lower protection than agriculture in developing countries, and a further 
reflection of the importance of high-income country farm support programs in 
depressing developing country farm incomes. 
  The differential impacts on net farm incomes within regions from freeing trade 
are shown in Table 4. In East Asia it is primarily Chinese farming that would benefit 
while in South Asia, farming is benefited in Pakistan and Sri Lanka rather than in India 
and Bangladesh. That reflects the latter countries’ relatively weaker comparative 
                                                 
9   The smallness of our estimated contribution of service sector distortions to value added in 
agricultural and other goods sectors is consistent with the findings of two other recent studies 
drawing on similar service distortion estimates (Dee 2004; Dihel 2004). Recall, though, that the 
distortions to the services sector we use (see Table 2) may well seriously underestimate the full 





10 Only in a handful of the developing countries listed (Russia, 
Bangladesh, India and the Philippines) would farmers be worse off under full reform. In 
each case this is because of the large negative impact of developing (including their 
own-) country agricultural and food policy reform.  
  How important is own-country liberalization as distinct from other countries’ 
liberalization? This is shown in Table 5 for a selection of developing countries. Farmers 
in Argentina and especially Brazil would gain hugely from high-income agricultural 
reform and a little from their own and other developing countries’ reforms; farmers in 
China also would gain a lot from high-income country reform but, as for the other 
developing country regions shown, they would lose a little from own reform; and 
farmers in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa also would lose a little from other 
developing countries’ reform. In Indonesia and Sub-Saharan Africa, farmers would 
gain overall from global liberalization; but in Bangladesh and India the farmers’ gain 
from high-income countries’ reform is not enough to offset the loss from own and other 
developing countries’ reform – instead it is manufacturing that would gain in those two 
countries, mainly from own-country reform. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the biggest 
proportional gain in sectoral value added is in non-agricultural primary activities (three 
times that for agriculture), mainly from own-country reform, reflecting the strong 
comparative advantage of non-food primary production in that region. 
  When the effects of the liberalizations in Table 5 are separated into agricultural 
and non-agricultural reform, as in Table 6, it is evident that agricultural reform by other 
                                                 
10   As measured by, for example, population density or the share of agriculture in the country’s exports 
relative to agriculture’s share of global exports (Balassa’s ‘revealed’ comparative advantage index – 




developing countries reduces the adverse effect on net farm income of own-country 
agricultural reform (and conversely for non-agricultural liberalization). This illustrates 
yet again the interdependencies of policies of different countries in our globalized 
world, and underscores the importance of addressing these distortions in a multilateral 
forum as provided for by the WTO. 
  The tariffs reported in Table 1 show import protection in South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa to be half as large again in agriculture and food processing as in other 
manufacturing. Yet careful studies that compare domestic and border prices for some of 
those countries have found very little actual protection delivered to farmers from import 
barriers (e.g., Mullen, Orden and Gulati 2005; Martin and Wang 2004), suggesting 
there may be ‘water’ in the agricultural tariffs that are included in the GTAP database. 
What would be the impact of trade reform on net farm incomes if the delivered 
protection rates to agriculture were in fact zero?  
To see how much difference that could make to the results, we re-calibrated the 
model assuming agricultural tariff protection in 2001 was actually zero in Bangladesh, 
India, and Sub-Saharan Africa other than South Africa, and then re-ran the full global 
liberalization simulation. The difference this makes to the net farm income results for 
those countries, shown in the lower part of Table 6, suggests that the earlier small gain 
to Sub-Saharan African farmers from global liberalization would nearly quadruple, and 
the small losses to farmers in Bangladesh and India would switch to a gain of around 4 
percent. These simulations underscore the point that the results depend heavily on own-
country agricultural protection rates, which in the current GTAP database are assumed 




case of developing countries (whereas for high-income countries they are based on the 
much more thorough estimates of producer support estimates provided by OECD 
2005a). 
  Also, the GTAP database includes only a few export taxes (see Table 1(b)), yet 
there is evidence that others exist even if they are small in most cases (Piermartini 
2004). In Argentina’s case some sizeable ones were re-introduced in 2002 (OECD 
2005b, Annex A). To see how much difference they could make to the effects of 
reform, we re-calibrated the model assuming not only that Argentina’s agricultural 
tariff protection in 2001 was zero but also that the country had export taxes of 20 
percent for cereals, oilseeds and livestock products, 10 percent for other (including non-
agricultural) primary products, and 5 percent for other processed food products and 
other manufacturing.
11 From that new base we then re-estimated the effects of full 
unilateral reform. As shown in Table 6, that database amendment makes a huge 
difference to the impact of unilateral reform on agricultural value added in Argentina. It 
also raises the estimated impact of reform on non-agricultural value added, mostly 
because of the boost it gives to food processing. Instead of having just a minor effect, 
the presence of these new export taxes mean that own-reform by Argentina would boost 
net incomes of its farmers by a dramatic one-third; and global reform would boost them 
by more than one-half, instead of an estimated one-fifth as of 2001 before those export 
taxes were imposed. 
                                                 
11   Based on the Ministry of Economy and Production’s resolutions 11/2002, 35/2002, and 532/2004, 




  Pending a more-thorough estimation of production and trade taxes and subsidies 
in developing country, how does the current estimated pattern of distortions (ignoring 
the amendments discussed above regarding the bottom part of Table 6) affect 
developing countries’ shares of global markets? Their share of all agricultural and food 
value added would be three percentage points higher at 49 percent if global markets 
were fully liberalized, and their export share would be five percentage points higher at 
40 percent, with the increases being largest for grains, oilseeds, beef, cotton and sugar. 
These changes for agriculture are much larger than those for other sectors (bottom of 
Table 7), although other sectors’ shares also rise a little as the developing countries’ 
importance in the global economy expands. 
  The propensity to trade agricultural commodities internationally would rise 
substantially following global liberalization. This is important because, by thereby 
‘thickening’ international markets, food price fluctuations would be dampened, which 
would reduce concerns about vulnerability to import dependence. The extent of this 
global public good aspect of agricultural trade reform can be sensed from the results 
reported in Table 8. Rice and sugar are especially noteworthy: their global shares of 
production exported treble and nearly double, respectively – a direct result of the very 
high protection in those two product markets. For all agricultural and processed food 
products as a group, the share would rise by one-fifth for the world as a whole, and by 
almost one-third for developing countries.  
The converse of that rise in export propensity is an increase in imports as a 
share of food consumption as farmers throughout the world specialize more in what 




third as consumers adjust their consumption bundle to their income increase and to 
changes in relative prices (final column of Table 8), suggesting food self-sufficiency 
would not change much. The latter is confirmed in Table 9: it shows an increase from 
101 percent to just 102 percent for all agriculture and food for developing countries. 
Not surprisingly given the earlier results and underlying protection rates, the biggest 
rises are in rice and sugar, where self-sufficiency rates rise 5 or 6 percentage points for 
developing countries.    
To what extent are the effects of agricultural policies on net farm incomes due 
to the three key ‘pillars’ of agricultural support programs that are explicitly negotiated 
at the WTO, namely domestic producer subsidies, export subsidies, and import tariffs? 
As anticipated from Table 1, the first two are economically significant only in high-
income countries; and Table 10 confirms that the removal of export subsidies would 
make almost no contribution to farm incomes on average (the loss in high-income 
countries being fully offset by the gain to farmers in developing countries). Domestic 
subsidies and import tariffs are equally important to developing country net farm 
incomes, each contributing 45 percent of the overall impact of global trade policies on 
those incomes (see final three columns of Table 10).  
In terms of impact on global agricultural trade, the middle row of Table 10 
shows that a much bigger 86 percent of the growth that would occur under full reform 
would come from import expansion – again underlining the relative importance of the 
market access ‘pillar’.  
Finally from Table 10, note from the bottom rows that the importance of the 




for a huge 93 percent and domestic and export subsidies just 5 and 2 percent, 
respectively.
12 This difference is partly explained by the fact that trade measures are a 
tax on consumers, in addition to boosting value added for producers. So, unlike direct 
domestic farm subsidies which only affect consumers via small second-round effects 
insofar as they alter international food prices, trade measures doubly harm national 
welfare. 
How do different agricultural commodity programs contribute to the global 
welfare cost of agricultural and food market distortions? According to our GTAP-AGR 
model results, rice programs are the most important, followed by beef and oilseeds and 
then sugar and dairy products (Table 11). High-income policies are responsible for 82 
percent of that cost of agricultural and food policies (compared with only 49 percent in 
the case of policies affecting other manufacturing – see part (b) of Table 11). The 
extraordinarily high contribution of rice reflects the enormous tariffs and subsidies in 
that sector in Japan and Korea but also, if to a lesser extent, in other East Asian 
economies and in the European Union. In addition there is considerable domestic 
support for US rice producers. Tariffs are high in beef also, together with some export 
subsidies. Tariffs are somewhat lower in oilseed products, where in high-income 
countries most support comes from producer subsidies; however in developing 
countries the oilseed processing sector is protected from import competition, and since 
those products are a crucial input into livestock industries they add to the adverse 
                                                 
12    For details of the GTAP-AGR model’s estimated economic welfare effects of full global trade 
reform, see Hertel and Keeney (2006). The contribution of export subsidies is small partly because 
most distortions (notably import tariffs but also export taxes) cause the world to trade less than is 
optimal globally, so export subsidies offset that tendency. It turns out they are not a full offset 
though, because they also have inefficient resource allocative effects in the imposing countries. For 




welfare contributions of those industries’ policies as well. Together these results 
suggest much of the welfare cost of protection globally could be removed if just a few 
agricultural markets were liberalized. 
 
Conclusions and areas for further research  
 
  The following are the key messages that emerge from our analysis:  
•  The answer to the question in the title of the paper is yes, in the sense that full 
global liberalization of goods and services trade would raise net farm income in 
all six developing country regions, and more than it would raise non-agricultural 
value added; 
•  Global liberalization would not raise net farm incomes in each and every 
developing country, however, with our results suggesting that Bangladesh, 
India, the Philippines and Russia would be among the exceptions – but only 
because of their own high agricultural protection rates in the GTAP database;   
•  With that Version 6 GTAP database, our results are not inconsistent with those 
of Jensen, Robinson and Tarp (2002) in that for several large developing 
countries (Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia), own-country policies help 
rather than harm agricultural relative to non-agricultural value added, with the 
harm from own non-agricultural policies being more than offset by help from 
own agricultural and food policies; and 
•  Other countries’ policies have the opposite effect, of depressing agricultural 




contributing most to that finding notwithstanding the tariff preferences provided 
to numerous low-income countries. 
These results suggest that a multilateral move to global free trade would be 
good for developing country farmers. Whether that would be true too for a unilateral 
reform by any particular developing country depends heavily on the extent to which 
that country’s own policies effectively assist or harm that economy’s farm sector 
relative to its other sectors. Our measures of those effects depend very much on the 
levels of distortion in the GTAP database we use, as is clear from the sensitivity 
analysis of results reported above in Table 6. The agricultural distortions for high-
income countries are reasonably reliable, thanks in large part to the carefully compiled 
protection estimates by the OECD (2005a and earlier). Currently available estimates of 
(particularly agricultural) trade distortions and subsidies in developing countries are 
less reliable, however. Nor are estimates provided in the GTAP database for all export 
taxes or tax equivalents of quantitative restrictions and bans on exports by developing 
countries. A new project at the World Bank is seeking to provide better estimates of 
that sort, building on the earlier work of Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988) and the 
OECD’s comprehensive PSE methodology and improved methods for measuring of 
exchange rate misalignment (Hinkle and Montiel 1999). Distortions to factor markets, 
particularly labor, may also have an important influence on the results for some 
countries if they were to be included in the model. Even more challenging is the task of 
improving estimates of distortions to services trade and foreign direct investment. 
These are the next frontiers in improving our understanding of the impact of policies on 




possible to generate better estimates of the poverty consequences of such reforms, 
building on Winters (2005) and the pioneering empirical work in Hertel and Winters 
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and region, 2001 
(percent of cif import value) 














b  20.2 13.0 16.0  0.5  2.1 
  Australia & New Zealand  1.2  8.1  5.7  3.9  5.7 
  United States  2.3  2.6  2.5  0.0  1.9 
  Canada  1.2  14.4  9.1  0.0  0.9 
  Mexico  10.8  12.2  11.5  4.7  4.5 
  European Union (EU15)  12.4  13.2  12.8  0.1  1.8 
  EU’s 10 new entrants  9.7  18.7  15.1  0.4  3.1 
  European Free Trade Area  29.6  31.3  30.7  0.1  1.9 
  Japan  47.7  21.8  30.2  0.1  1.7 
  Korea & Taiwan   87.9  23.0  55.8  3.5  4.1 
  Hong Kong & Singapore  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0 
        
Developing countries  17.0 19.3 18.1  2.5  10.0 
     Middle-income countries  17.8  15.6  16.7  1.1  9.7 
     Low-income countries  14.9  27.3  21.5  6.0  10.6 
  E. Europe & Central Asia  13.4  15.9  14.9  0.3  5.7 
    Russia  14.5  12.8  13.5  0.8  9.2 
    Other E. Europe & C. Asia  12.5  19.1  16.1  0.3  4.1 
  East Asia & Pacific  31.4  20.2  26.1  0.8 9.8 
    China  49.0  18.6  37.6  0.4  12.7 
    Indonesia  4.3  6.3  5.0  0.4  4.9 
    Philippines  14.1  6.6  9.5  3.0  2.3 
    Viet Nam  12.6  44.4  36.6  3.8  14.5 
    Other East Asia & Pacific  17.9  26.1  22.6  0.6  6.9 
  South Asia  18.0  54.7  33.9  14.5  22.7 
    Bangladesh  7.5  21.1  12.6  20.0  19.8 
    India  25.6  76.6  50.2  15.0  27.3 
    Other South Asia  14.6  32.4  21.5  10.4  12.8 
  Middle East & North Africa  9.5  18.0  13.6  3.5 9.3 
    Morocco  26.5  35.5  29.3  9.0  22.0 
    Other M. East & N. Africa  8.3  17.4  12.8  2.5  8.7 
  Sub-Saharan Africa  15.3  20.5  18.3  2.0  12.0 
    South Africa  6.1  10.9  8.9  0.0  7.0 
    Other Sub-Saharan Africa  17.1 22.3 20.1  3.8  14.2 
  Latin America & Caribbean  7.1  11.1  9.5  2.0  9.7 
    Argentina  5.4  7.6  6.9  0.4  10.5 
    Brazil  2.4  9.0  5.0  0.4  10.9 
    Other Latin America & Carib.  9.0  11.7  10.7  3.5  9.1 
WORLD  18.9 15.0 16.8  0.9  4.2 
  




Table 1(b):  Export-weighted average applied export subsidies/taxes on goods, by 
sector and region, 2001 
 (percent of fob export value, negatives are export taxes) 














b  1.0  3.0 2.3 0.0  0.0 
  Australia & New Zealand  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.5  -1.1 
  United States  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0 
  Canada  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  Mexico  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  European Union (EU15)  6.2  8.1  7.7  0.0  0.0 
  EU’s 10 new entrants  0.2  0.8  0.6  0.0  0.0 
  European Free Trade Area  4.1  3.9  3.9  0.0  0.0 
  Japan  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  Korea & Taiwan   1.8  0.0  0.4  0.0  -0.1 
  Hong Kong & Singapore  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.2 
         
Developing countries  0.0  0.0  0.0  -1.8  -1.0 
     Middle-income countries  0.1  0.0  0.0  -2.2  -1.2 
     Low-income countries  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.2  -0.8 
  E. Europe & Central Asia  0.0  0.0  0.0  -5.7  -1.4 
    Russia  0.0  0.0  0.0  -7.6  -3.2 
    Other E. Europe & C. Asia  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
  East Asia & Pacific  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  -1.1 
    China  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -1.6 
    Indonesia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.9 
    Philippines  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  -0.2 
    Viet Nam  0.0  0.0  0.0  -1.2  -5.3 
    Other East Asia & Pacific  0.0  0.0  0.0  -1.0  -0.3 
  South Asia  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.3  -2.1 
    Bangladesh  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    India  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -1.6 
    Other South Asia  0.0  0.0  0.0  -2.1  -4.4 
  Middle East & North Africa  0.4  0.0  0.2  -1.8  -0.8 
    Morocco  0.0  0.0  0.0  -2.8  -2.6 
    Other M. East & N. Africa  0.5  0.0  0.3  -1.8  -0.6 
  Sub-Saharan Africa  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2 
    South Africa  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.5 
    Other Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.2  -0.2 
  Latin America & Caribbean  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.3  0.1 
    Argentina  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.7  -0.5 
    Brazil  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.4  -0.4 
    Other Latin America & Carib.  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.3  0.7 
 
(continued) 




Table 1(c): Production-weighted average applied domestic producer subsidies on 
goods, by sector and region, 2001 
(percent of trade-distorted value of production) 














b  11.1 0.0 3.1 0.0  0.1 
  Australia & New Zealand  2.3  0.0  1.0  0.0  0.0 
  United States  13.6  0.0  3.3  0.0  0.0 
    Canada  9.7 0.0 3.0 0.0  0.0 
    Mexico  7.6 0.0 2.2 0.0  0.0 
  European Union (EU15)  15.9  0.0  4.1  0.0  0.4 
  EU’s 10 new entrants  4.8  0.0  1.5  0.0  0.0 
  European Free Trade Area  34.1  0.7  7.0  0.0  0.1 
    Japan  3.4 0.0 1.0 0.0  0.0 
  Korea & Taiwan   2.0  0.0  0.9  0.0  0.0 
  Hong Kong & Singapore  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.9  0.0 
        
Developing countries  0.6 0.0 0.4 0.0  0.0 
     Middle-income countries  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0 
     Low-income countries  1.4  0.0  1.0  0.0  0.1 
  E. Europe & Central Asia  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0 
    Russia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    Other E. Europe & C. Asia  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0 
  East Asia & Pacific  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    China  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    Indonesia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    Philippines  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    Viet Nam  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    Other East Asia & Pacific  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  South Asia  2.5  0.0  2.2  0.0  0.2 
    Bangladesh  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.7 
    India  3.4  0.0  2.9  0.0  0.0 
    Other South Asia  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3 
  Middle East & North Africa  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
    Morocco  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    Other M. East & N. Africa  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  Sub-Saharan Africa  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    South Africa  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    Other Sub-Saharan Africa  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
  Latin America & Caribbean  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.0 
    Argentina  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
    Brazil  0.7  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0 
    Other Latin America & Carib.  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0 
a Forestry, fishing, coal, oil, gas, and minerals  
b Intra-EU15 trade is ignored in EU and world trade in calculating trade weights 




Table 2: Estimates of services trade barriers, 2001  
 













High-income countries        
Australia & New Zealand  0.0 2.3  9.5  15.2 
United States  0.0 22.6  1.2  16.0 
Canada  0.0 22.6  1.2  16.0 
Mexico  0.0 22.6  1.2  16.0 
European Union (EU15)  9.6 3.2  2.9  4.6 
EU’s 10 new entrants  1.6 0.0  0.0  0.0 
European Free Trade Area  9.6 3.2  2.9  4.6 
Japan  0.0 0.0  6.3  0.0 
Korea & Taiwan  0.0 0.0  6.3  0.0 
Hong Kong & Singapore  0.0 0.0  6.3  0.0 
        
Developing countries        
Eastern Europe & Central Asia  1.6 0.0  0.0  0.0 
China  0.0 14.5  37.4 3.7 
All other East Asia & Pacific  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
India  61.3 63.9  32.1  62.2 
All other South Asia  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
Middle East & North Africa  2.3 0.0  0.0  0.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa  28.3 17.5  32.8  22.6 
        
All other Latin America & Carib  13.8 10.4  8.6 5.9 
 
Source: Francois et al. (2005) and Hertel and Keeney (2006) 
 




Table 3: Changes in sectoral value added from full global trade reform for 
different developing country regions, by trade-liberalizing component 
(percent) 
Change in sectoral value 






















Primary Agriculture           
All developing countries  6.7 -2.6  0.9  0.7  5.7 (1.8)
      Middle-income countries  8.3 -2.1  1.4  0.4  8.0 (1.3)
      Low-income countries  3.8 -3.5  0.2  1.2  1.6 (3.6)
  E. Europe & Central Asia   3.1 -2.2  -0.4  0.0  0.6 (-0.5)
  East Asia & Pacific  8.1 -1.5  2.6  0.5  9.6 (5.0)
  South Asia  2.8 -4.2  0.1  1.4  0.2 (-0.3)
  MiddleEast & North Africa  6.1 -5.1  0.3  0.2  1.5 (0.8)
  Sub-Saharan Africa  5.1 -4.4  0.4  1.5  2.7 (2.5)
  Latin America & Carib.  12.2 -0.5  0.2  0.4  12.2 (-0.3)
Processed Food          
All developing countries  3.6 -1.1  1.1  0.4  4.0  
      Middle-income countries  3.3 -1.9  0.9  0.2  2.5  
      Low-income countries  4.5 1.3  1.5  0.8  8.3  
  E. Europe & Central Asia   5.4 -7.0  0.8  0.2  -0.5  
  East Asia & Pacific  1.0 5.1  2.7  0.1  8.9  
  South Asia  9.4 -7.5  2.0  1.0  4.9  
  MiddleEast & North Africa  6.0 -6.8  1.6  0.2  1.0  
  Sub-Saharan Africa  4.9 -5.6  1.5  1.8  2.6  
  Latin America & Carib.  3.4 -0.6  0.0  0.3  3.1  
Non-ag Primary          
All developing countries  0.2 0.3  0.6  0.5  1.6  
      Middle-income countries  0.0 0.4  1.5  0.2  2.1  
      Low-income countries  0.7 0.1  -1.3  1.3  0.8  
  E. Europe & Central Asia   -0.2 0.9  1.7  -0.3  2.1  
  East Asia & Pacific  0.9 0.3  -0.9  0.6  0.9  
  South Asia  1.6 0.1  -8.7  1.4  -5.6  
  Middle East & North Africa  0.1 0.4  2.9  -0.3  3.0  
  Sub-Saharan Africa  0.3 -0.2  4.0  2.8  6.9  
  Latin America & Carib.  -0.9 -0.1  1.2  0.5  0.7  
Other Manufacturing          
All developing countries  -0.5 0.3  1.3  0.4  1.5  
      Middle-income countries  -0.5 0.4  0.6  0.3  0.8  
      Low-income countries  -0.6 0.1  3.5  0.8  3.8  
  E. Europe & Central Asia   -0.5 0.7  -2.0  -0.3  -2.0  
  East Asia & Pacific  -0.3 0.2  5.3  0.3  5.5  
  South Asia  -0.6 0.5  -0.9  1.8  0.8  
  Middle East & North Africa  -0.4 0.5  -0.9  -0.7  -1.5  
  Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.0 1.0  -3.4  2.5  -1.0  
  Latin America & Carib.  -0.6 0.2  -1.6  0.5  -1.5  
a Numbers in parentheses show percentage change in non-agricultural value added as a 




Table 4: Changes in agricultural (and non agricultural) value added from full 
global trade reform for different regions, by trade-liberalizing component 
(percent) 
Change in agricultural value 
























High-income countries  -23.4 0.6  -0.2  0.2  -22.8 (0.2)
  Australia & New Zealand  16.2 0.5 0.7  0.2  17.7 (1.3)
  United States  -15.0 0.9  -0.3  0.2  -14.2 (-0.5)
  Canada  -6.9 0.2 0.5  0.3  -5.9 (-1.3)
  Mexico  -8.7 0.1  -0.8  0.2  -9.2 (-0.2)
  European Union (EU15)  -26.6 0.4  -0.5  0.2  -26.5 (-0.6)
  EU’s 10 new entrants  -1.8 1.8  -0.5  0.1  -0.4 (0.9)
  European Free Trade Area  -37.4 5.4 0.4  0.1  -31.6 (-2.8)
  Japan  -55.5 -0.2  0.3  0.1  -55.3 (2.6)
  Korea & Taiwan   -41.0 0.0 1.0  0.2  -39.8 (6.5)
  Hong Kong & Singapore  3.0 0.5 0.4  1.1  5.0 (10.5)
Developing countries  6.7 -2.6  0.9  0.7  5.7 (1.8)
      Middle-income countries  8.3 -2.1  1.4  0.4  8.0 (1.3)
      Low-income countries  3.8 -3.5  0.2  1.2  1.6 (3.6)
  E. Europe & Central Asia  3.1 -2.2 -0.4  0.0  0.6 (-0.5)
    Russia  3.0 -4.5 -0.2  0.0  -1.6 (-0.5)
    Other E. Europe & C. Asia  3.1 -1.6 -0.4  0.1  1.2 (-0.4)
  East Asia & Pacific  8.1 -1.5  2.6  0.5  9.6 (5.0)
    China  8.8 -1.8  3.4  0.6  11.0 (4.3)
    Indonesia  2.3 0.1  -0.1  0.2  2.5 (4.1)
    Philippines  0.9 -6.4  1.4  0.0  -4.0 (5.3)
    Viet Nam  2.5 0.9 1.8  0.1  5.4 (27.5)
    Other East Asia & Pacific  12.8 2.1  -0.8  0.1  14.2 (7.0)
  South Asia  2.8 -4.2  0.1  1.4  0.2 (-0.3)
    Bangladesh  1.7 -4.7  1.6  0.0  -1.5 (1.5)
    India  2.6 -4.9 -0.2  1.8  -0.7 (-0.4)
    Other South Asia  4.0 -0.7  1.0  0.2  4.6 (-0.1)
  Middle East & North Africa  6.1 -5.1  0.3  0.2  1.5 (0.8)
    Morocco  10.6 -11.3  1.6  0.1  1.0 (7.2)
    Other M. East & N. Africa  5.8 -4.6  0.2  0.2  1.6 (0.5)
  Sub-Saharan Africa  5.1 -4.4  0.4  1.5  2.7 (2.5)
    South Africa  7.8 -2.6  0.1  1.2  6.5 (1.9)
    Other Sub-Saharan Africa  4.8 -4.6  0.5  1.7  2.4 (2.9)
  Latin America & Caribbean  12.2 -0.5  0.2  0.4  12.2 (-0.3)
    Argentina  14.3 3.8 0.5  0.6  19.2 (0.7)
    Brazil  39.1 1.9 0.7  0.8  42.5 (-0.6)
    Other Latin America & Carib.  13.3 -2.8  0.4  0.3  11.2 (-0.9)
World -4.5  -1.4  0.5  0.5  -4.9 (0.6)
a Numbers in parentheses show percentage change in non-agricultural value added as a 
consequence of full global trade reform. 




Table 5: Changes in sectoral value added from own, other countries’ and global full 


















Brazil      
Primary Agriculture  1.6  1.9  38.9  42.5 
Processed Food  0.5  -0.5  22.8  22.9 
Non-agric Primary  3.5  0.9  -9.7  -5.4 
Other  Manufacturing  -2.3 -0.4 -2.4  -5.1 
Argentina      
Primary Agriculture  1.2  3.4  14.6  19.2 
Processed  Food  0.5 0.7 4.5  5.7 
Non-agric Primary  1.8  2.0  -2.0  1.8 
Other Manufacturing  -1.7  -0.4  0.9  -1.2 
China      
Primary Agriculture  -2.2  1.4  11.9  11.0 
Processed  Food  1.7 1.0 1.7  4.5 
Non-agric Primary  1.8  -0.6  0.6  1.7 
Other  Manufacturing  2.0 1.1 1.6  4.7 
Indonesia      
Primary  Agriculture  -2.4 2.0 2.9  2.5 
Processed Food  0.1  10.0  2.4  12.5 
Non-agric  Primary  -0.3 -0.9 -0.7  -1.9 
Other  Manufacturing  2.0 0.3 4.1  6.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa (excl. S. Africa)       
Primary Agriculture  -2.4  -0.4  5.2  2.4 
Processed Food  -2.7  -0.2  5.1  2.2 
Non-agric Primary  6.2  -0.2  0.5  6.6 
Other  Manufacturing  2.3 -1.2 -2.9  -1.8 
India      
Primary Agriculture  -4.1  -0.5  3.8  -0.7 
Processed Food  -7.3  1.2  13.4  7.3 
Non-agric  Primary  -7.6 0.0 1.8  -5.8 
Other Manufacturing  0.9  -0.7  0.1  0.3 
Bangladesh      
Primary Agriculture  -2.7  -1.4  2.6  -1.5 
Processed Food  -5.5  0.3  -0.7  -5.9 
Non-agric  Primary  -5.7 -1.3 -0.4  -7.4 
Other Manufacturing  8.3  -2.2  1.1  7.2 
 




Table 6: Changes in agricultural value added from own, other countries’ and global full trade liberalization of agricultural 




  Agricultural liberalization   
Non-agricultural 
















 Own  Other  
countries All countries 
a 
Brazil  -0.6  2.5  39.1  2.2 -0.6  -0.2  1.6 40.9  42.5    (-0.6)
Argentina  -0.2  4.0  14.3   1.4 -0.6  0.3   1.2 18.0  19.2   (0.7)
China  -2.0  0.2  8.8   -0.2 1.2  3.1   -2.2 13.2  11.0   (4.3)
Indonesia  -2.1  2.2  2.3   -0.3 -0.3  0.6   -2.4 4.9  2.5   (4.1)
Sub-Saharan Africa, ex. SA  -4.7  0.1  4.8   2.3 -0.5  0.4   -2.4 4.8  2.4   (2.9)
India -5.2  0.2  2.6   1.1 -0.8  1.3   -4.1 3.5  -0.7  (-0.4)
Bangladesh  -4.7  0.0  1.7   2.0 -1.3  1.0   -2.7 1.2  -1.5   (1.5)
                  
If zero national agric & food tariffs in the following countries, 
effects there are as follows: 
Argentina
b  34.4  4.3  16.0   0.3 -0.6  0.3   34.7 20.0  54.7  (6.9)
Sub-Saharan Africa, ex. SA  0.0  -0.2  4.5  2.2 -0.5  0.4  2.2 4.3  6.5    (3.7)
India  0.0  -0.3  2.7  1.2 -0.8  1.3  1.2 2.9  4.1  (-0.2)
Bangladesh 0.0  0.0  1.7   2.1 -1.4  1.0   2.1 1.2  3.3  (1.2)
 
a Numbers in parentheses show percentage changes in non-agricultural value added as a consequence of full global trade reform. 
b In Argentina’s case, we first altered the GTAP database not only to set all its agricultural and food import tariffs to zero but also to 
simulate the imposition from 2002 of export taxes, set at 20 percent for cereals, oilseeds and livestock products, 10 percent for other 
(including non agricultural) primary products, and 5 percent for other processed food products and all other manufacturing; then from 
that new base we estimated the effects of full unilateral reform. 
 




Table 7: Developing countries’ shares of global output, value added and exports 




Developing Countries’ share of global 
Value of Output Value  Added  Value of Exports 
  Base  Full 
liberalization Base  Full 
liberalization Base  Full 
liberalization 
Rice 71  92  75  93  66  73 
Wheat 72  73  54  70  23  34 
Coarse grains  63  63  49  63  29  33 
Fruit & veg.  71  73  72  75  47  54 
Oilseed products  52  52  52  59  50  61 
Sugar 53  59  54  60  67  75 
Cotton 73  75  70  76  48  60 
Other crops   51  51  47  48  60  59 
Beef & sheepmeat  36  41  37  45  17  47 
Pork & poultry  46  47  56  58  24  21 
Wool 80  81  34  35  20  29 
Dairy products  31  31  74  76  9  13 
Other food products  31  31  24  24  32  31 
All agric and food  43  45  46  49  35  40 
            
Non-agric primary  61  61  62  62  72  72 
Other manufacturing  26  25  21  21  24  26 
Services 16  16  14  15  18  18 
 




Table 8: Share of production exported and of consumption imported, world and developing countries, before and after full 
global liberalization of goods and services, by product 
(percent) 
 
Share of production exported 





countries  Developing 
countries    Developing 
countries 
  Base  Full 
liberalization  Base  Full 
liberalization Base  Full 
liberalization Base  Full 
liberalization 
Rice  3.3 10.8  3.8  35.7  3.1 8.5    3.2 4.2 
Wheat  16.9 19.1  45.6  46.1  5.4 9.0    14.2  15.9 
Coarse grains  13.7 15.2  26.1  27.7  6.3 8.0    10.4  12.0 
Fruit & veg.  10.6 11.4  19.5  19.8  7.0 8.3    3.4 4.2 
Oilseed products  15.1 20.4  15.5  16.7  14.8  23.7    15.0  24.0 
Sugar  5.1 9.7  3.5  6.0  6.5  12.3    5.2  6.5 
Cotton  20.7 20.9  40.7  33.4  13.5  16.7    17.1  17.4 
Other crops   18.9 21.2  15.3  17.7  22.3  24.5    10.6  15.1 
Beef & sheepmeat  6.8 9.4  8.8  8.5  3.2  10.7    4.6  5.0 
Pork & poultry  7.7 9.2  10.9  13.6  3.9  4.1    4.0  5.6 
Wool  16.2 16.6  65.3  60.8  4.1 6.0    9.4  10.3 
Dairy products  6.2 8.1  8.2  10.3  1.7  3.4    6.4  8.2 
Other food products  10.2 11.3  10.1  11.3  10.5  11.3    7.7 9.8 
All agric and food  9.6 11.7  11.1  12.8  7.7  10.2    6.8 8.7 
                  
Non-agric primary  30.7 31.4  22.2  22.5  36.1  37.0    14.6  15.8 
Other manufacturing  28.4 30.6  29.0  30.3  26.7  31.6    26.6  32.5 
Services  3.5 3.7  3.4  3.6  4.0  4.2    4.9  5.2 




Table 9:  Self-sufficiency by product and region, 2001 baseline and after full liberalization of goods and services globally 
 









& Carib.  China India 
  Base Full  Lib. Base  Full Lib Base Full Lib Base  Full Lib Base  Full Lib Base  Full Lib
Rice 99  60  100  105 86 72 96 94 101  116 103 106
Wheat 131  123  91  92 48 50 91 90 98  99 103 106
Coarse grains  107  106  96  96 101 101 112 115 103  107 101 101
Fruit & veg.  87  84  104  105 125 126 127 135 101  102 99 96
Oilseed products  98 98  100 100 94 104 129 133 81 59 95 80
Sugar 98  90  101  107 109 125 121 143 84  81 102 103
Cotton 108  98  96  99 232 289 101 101 98  99 90 91
Other crops   85  87  115  112 139 139 141 127 114  105 107 107
Beef&sheepmeat  100 95 99 106 100 108 103 119 97 96 106 153
Pork & poultry  100  101  100  98 98 94 105 102 100  99 99 95
Wool 124  119  95  95 104 106 110 107 87  91 88 84
Dairy products  102  102  95  95 83 82 98 98 93  90 100 100
Other food prod  98  98  103  102 100 98 109 109 103  103 115 115
All agric&food  98  97  101  102 104 104 110 114 100  101 101 101
             
Non-ag primary  68  68  132  134 172 174 131 134 96  95 79 77
Other manuf.  98  99  97  99 80 81 87 85 106  108 98 101
Services 100  100  99  99 98 98 100 99 98  98 100 100
 




Table 10: Contributions to regional and global agricultural value added, to global agricultural trade, and to global economic 









liberalization of:  
 























Contribution to value added:              
% loss High-income countries  3  44  56  0 0  -3  3 44 53 
% gain Developing countries  10  45  106  0 0  -61 10 45 45 
% loss World  -0.3 46  31  0 0  23  -0 46 54 
Contribution to world 
agricultural trade 






0  30  -2 16 86 
Contribution to economic 
welfare: 
 (equivalent variation in income):      
  
    
High-income countries  5 6  78 0 0  11 5 6  89 
Developing countries  -10 2  84 0 -1  25 -10  1  109 
World  2 5  79 0  0  14 2 5  93 
 
 




Table 11:  Contribution of different products to the global welfare gain from 




Share of welfare 
contribution due 
to high-income 







contribution    
Rice 37  97   
Wheat 3  134   
Coarse grains  4  111   
Fruits and vegetables  2  40   
Oilseed products  13  31   
Sugar 8  92   
Cotton 0.1  425   
Other crops  2  -49   
Beef and sheep products  14  91   
Pork and poultry products  4  64   
Wool 0.2  64   
Dairy products  5  119   
Other food products  8  54   
Total, agriculture and food  100  82   
 
(b) all sectors’ reform 
 
 
Share of all 
sectors’ 
welfare 
contribution    
Agriculture and food  30  82   
Non-agricultural primary  0  -18   
Other manufacturing  7  49   
Sub-total, all commodities  47  69   
Services 53  72   
Total, all products  100  70   
 
 




Appendix Table A1: Regional aggregation used 
Modeled region  Original GTAP database region 
High-income countries   
  Australia & New Zealand    Australia; New Zealand 
  United States    United States 
  Canada    Canada 
  Mexico    Mexico 
  European Union (EU15)    Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; United  
   Kingdom; Greece; Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Portugal;  
    Spain; Sweden 
  EU’s 10 new entrants    Cyprus; Czech Republic; Hungary; Malta; Poland; Slovakia; Slovenia;  
    Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania 
  European Free Trade Area    Switzerland; Rest of EFTA 
  Japan    Japan 
  Korea & Taiwan     Korea; Taiwan  
  Hong Kong & Singapore  Hong Kong; Singapore 
Developing countries   
E. Europe & Central Asia   
Russia Russian  Federation 
Other E. Europe & C. Asia  Albania; Bulgaria; Croatia; Romania; Rest of Former 
   Soviet Union; Turkey; Rest of Europe 




Viet Nam  Viet Nam 
Other East Asia & Pacific  Malaysia; Thailand; Rest of SE Asia; Rest of East Asia; Rest of Oceania 
South Asia   
Bangladesh Bangladesh 
India India 
Other South Asia  Sri Lanka; Rest of South Asia 
Middle East & North Africa   
Morocco Morocco 
Other M. East & N.Africa  Rest of Middle East; Tunisia; Rest of North Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa   
South Africa   South Africa 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  Botswana; Madagascar; Malawi; Mozambique; Tanzania; Uganda; 
Zambia; Zimbabwe; Rest of South African CU; Rest of SADC; Rest of 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Latin America & Caribbean   
Argentina Argentina 
Brazil Brazil 
Other Latin America & Carib.  Colombia; Peru; Venezuela; Rest of Andean Pact; Chile; Uruguay; Rest 
of South America; Central America; Rest of FTAA; Rest of Caribbean 
Post-simulation aggregated developing country regions, by income classification 
Middle-income countries: China, Argentina, Brazil, Other Latin America & Carib., Russia, Other 
E. Europe & C. Asia, Morocco, Other M. East & N. Africa, South Africa 
Low-income countries: Indonesia, Philippines, Viet Nam, Other East Asia & Pacific, India, 








CGE Modeled sector  Original GTAP database 
sectors 
Rice  Paddy rice  Pdr 
  Processed rice  Pcr 
Wheat  Wheat Wht 
Coarse grains  Cereals Gro 
Fruit & vegetables  Fruits & vegetables  v_f 
Oilseed products  Oilseeds Osd 
  Oils & fats  Vol 
Sugar  Sugar raw  c_b 
  Sugar processed  Sgr 
Cotton  Plant-based fibers  Pfb 
Other crops   Crops nec  Ocr 
Beef & sheep products  Livestock Ctl 
  Meat products  Cmt 
Pork & poultry products  Other animal products  Oap 
  Other meat products  Omt 
Wool  Wool & silk-worm  Wol 
Dairy products  Milk raw  Rmk 
  Dairy Mil 
Other food products  Other food products  Ofd 
  Beverages & tobacco  b_t 
Other primary  Fishing Fsh 
  Other primary  frs, coa, oil, gas, omn 
Other manufacturing  Textiles & W. apparel  tex, wap, lea 
 
Manuf. of primary  lum, ppp, p_c, crp, nmm, 
i_s, nfm, fmp 
  Other manufactures  mvh, otn, ele, ome, omf 
Services  Utility & construction  ely, gdt, wtr, cns 
  Trade & transport  trd, otp, wtp, atp 
 Communic.  & 
financial  
cmn, ofi, isr, obs 
  Other services  ros, osg, dwe 
 
 
Post-simulation aggregated sectors 
 
Primary Agriculture: Paddy rice, Processed rice, Wheat, Cereals, Fruits & vegetables, Oilseeds, 
Sugar raw, Sugar processed, Fibers, Crops nec, Livestock, Other animal products, Milk raw, 
Wool & silk-worm.   
Processed Food:  Meat products, Other meat products, Dairy, Other food products, Oils & fats, 
Beverages & tobacco. 
Non-agric Primary: Fishing, Other primary. 
Other Manufacturing: Textiles & Wearing apparel, Manufacture of primary, Other manufactures. 
Services: Utility & construction, Trade & transport, Communication & financial, Other services 
 